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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EVERETT THOMAS, : 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : Case No. 990232-CA 
V. : 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE : Priority No. 15 
SAN JUAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff/appellant, Everett Thomas, brings this appeal from 
an order of the Seventh Judicial District Court granting summary 
judgment for defendant school district on his negligence claim. 
Jurisdiction in this Court is appropriate under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) pursuant to a transfer from the Supreme 
Court of Utah by order dated June 23, 1999. 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue before the Court for review is whether the 
district court correctly held that plaintiff/appellant failed to 
establish any special relationship with the school district 
forming grounds for a duty of care to prevent injuries he 
sustained when attempting to start a vapor-locked district 
vehicle. 
Standard of Review: In negligence claims, "[t]he issue of 
whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by 
the court." Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993); 
see also Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (same); 
Weber ex rel. Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 
(Utah 1986) ("The question of whether a 'duty1 exists is a 
question of law, and this court, which is not bound by the trial 
court's conclusions, may independently review the issue"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court for decision is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Plaintiff initiated this negligence action on May 30, 1996 
(R. 1-4). The complaint alleged that the San Juan School 
District breached its duty of care by negligently maintaining 
and/or operating a district-owned vehicle in a dangerous 
condition, leaving him with burn injuries when he voluntarily 
poured gasoline into the carburetor to start the engine. The 
school district answered (R. 16-22), denying liability and 
asserting a number of affirmative defenses. The case was 
assigned to a second judge (R. 10) after the first was 
disqualified on plaintiff's affidavit of bias and prejudice 
(R. 6-9). Plaintiff also moved to disqualify the school 
district's counsel (R. 25-33), but the motion was denied 
(R. 4 7-49). The second judge entered an order of recusal, dated 
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November 25, 1998 (R. 134-36), on the basis of his prior 
involvement with a criminal case in which plaintiff was the 
defendant, and a third judge was appointed (R. 172-74). 
On December 1, 1998, the school district moved for summary 
judgment (R. 137-38), explaining in its accompanying memorandum 
(R. 13 9-68) that because it had no "special relationship" with 
plaintiff, it owed him no duty of care. Plaintiff submitted a 
memorandum in opposition (R. 181-254) explicitly disavowing any 
dispute of the facts the school district presented as the basis 
for its motion (R. 181). The judge granted the motion 
(R. 272-75), holding that plaintiff, who had volunteered his 
assistance, "does not fall within the ambit of those persons to 
whom [a] duty was owed" (R. 273). The court further held that 
plaintiff's voluntary assistance was not foreseeable (id.). 
Plaintiff's timely notice of appeal (R. 284-85) followed the 
entry of the district court's final order. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
On May 24, 1994, Robin Benallie, a teacher employed by the 
San Juan School District, drove a group of her students to a 
boarding school operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 
Aneth, Utah, for the purpose of putting on a play (R. 140-41, 
ilH 1-2) . The vehicle she drove was a district-owned 1984 
Suburban. When the performance was over, Ms. Benallie and the 
students loaded the Suburban for the return trip, but she was 
unable to start it (R. 141, % 3). She then reentered the BIA 
school, by which plaintiff was employed, to call the San Juan 
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School District employee with whom she had arranged to use the 
Suburban (R. 231) and who had directed her to call him if she 
experienced problems with the vehicle (R. 232). 
Plaintiff had seen Ms. Benallie with her students on the 
step of the BIA school when he was on his way to another building 
to do some photocopying (R. 161). On his way back to the main 
building, some 15 to 20 minutes later, he saw a BIA janitor 
trying to start the Suburban by priming the carburetor, and 
stopped to volunteer his assistance (R. 161-62). When Ms. 
Benallie first observed him, he was in front of the Suburban 
pouring gasoline into the carburetor (R. 154). She attempted to 
talk to him, but his attention was focused on his conversation 
with the janitor (R. 163). By plaintiff's own admission, Ms. 
Benallie never asked him to assist her (R. 165-66). As he 
continued to pour gasoline into the carburetor and the vehicle 
backfired, the gasoline exploded, burning both plaintiff and Ms. 
Benallie (R. 166-67). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's decision in the school district's favor 
was based on the absence of a duty running to plaintiff based on 
either "special relationship" or foreseeability grounds. Rather 
than citing evidence of record that demonstrates error in the 
court's analysis on these essential points, plaintiff argues only 
that the school district's general duty not to use a vehicle 
which it knew or should have known posed an unreasonable risk of 
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harm to others necessarily reaches him and warrants a trial on 
the issue of its breach. His presumption that he lies within the 
class of protected "others" wrongly focuses his argument on the 
scope of the district's duty rather than on its applicability to 
him. 
Although an abundance of Utah case law addresses the factors 
which bear on the establishment of a "special relationship" 
conferring a duty, plaintiff has chosen to support his argument 
primarily with non-binding case law from other jurisdictions. 
His dissatisfaction with the result under Utah law does not 
diminish its authority. The evidence of record shows that 
plaintiff was neither a foreseeable victim of the school 
district's actions nor one to whom the district owed a special 
duty of care. Consequently, plaintiff has demonstrated no 
reversible error for this Court to correct. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S CASE CANNOT GO FORWARD BECAUSE HE WAS 
NOT A FORESEEABLE VICTIM OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT'S 
ACTIONS AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT OWE A DUTY OF 
CARE TO HIM INDIVIDUALLY. 
As established by the Supreme Court of Utah, "[o]ne 
essential element of a negligence action is a duty of reasonable 
care owed to the plaintiff by defendant. Absent a showing of a 
duty, [a plaintiff] cannot recover." Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 
P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); 
see also Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 (negligence plaintiff "must 
first establish a duty of care owed by the defendant to the 
5 
plaintiff"). Plaintiff asserts that, as the owner of the 
allegedly defective Suburban, the school district "had the legal 
duty to maintain that vehicle in good and safe operating 
condition" (Brief of Appellant at 11). He then leaps to the 
conclusion that because he was injured when the Suburban 
backfired, he was necessarily a foreseeable victim to whom that 
duty ran. This leap in logic is belied by the cautionary words 
in one of the cases on which he explicitly relies: "the concept 
of duty should not be equated with specific details of conduct. 
Duty refers to the relationship between individuals; it imposes a 
legal obligation on one party for the benefit of the other party. 
The specific details of conduct involved do not determine the 
duty owed but bear on the issue of whether a defendant has 
breached a duty owed." Alhambra Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 
165 Ariz. 38, 796 P.2d 470, 473 (1990). Absent a duty to 
plaintiff, there can be no breach. 
The district court determined "that it was not 
foreseeable that the Plaintiff would voluntarily attempt to 
assist the Defendant by pouring gasoline in the carburetor with 
the attendant injury. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was not within 
the scope of those persons to whom the duty was owed" (R. 273). 
Plaintiff does not take issue directly with this conclusion. 
Instead, he attempts to sidestep it by arguing, in essence, that 
had the allegedly defective vehicle not been in his presence 
through the school district's violation of its duty, he would not 
have volunteered to help start it and consequently would not have 
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been injured. While supporting his claim by asserting that Ms. 
Benallie "requested help and stood by while something she knew to 
be dangerous was occurring" (Brief of Appellant at 13, n.l), he 
ignores completely his own admission that she never sought his 
assistance (R. 165-66) and that when she attempted to speak with 
him, he didn't pay attention to what she was saying because he 
was already involved in efforts to start the Suburban (R. 163). 
Ms. Benallie's actions are simply insufficient to create a duty 
elevating plaintiff's status to that of a foreseeable victim. 
Moreover, under Utah law, "[t]o hold a government agency or 
one of its agents liable for negligence or gross negligence, a 
plaintiff cannot recover for the breach of a duty owed to the 
general public, but must show that a duty is owed to him or her 
as an individual." Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 
1993); see also Hunsaker, 870 P.2d at 897 (special relationship 
duty is "necessary premise for any negligence liability of the 
State actors"); Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 ("plaintiff must show a 
breach of a duty owed him as an individual, not merely the breach 
of an obligation owed to the general public at large by the 
governmental official"); Higcrins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P. 2d 
231, 236 (Utah 1993) (same); Cannon v. Univ. of Utah, 866 P.2d 
586, 589 (Utah App. 1993) ("when the government deals generally 
with the welfare of all, it does so without a duty to anyone, 
unless there is a 'special relationship' between the government 
and the individual"). Plaintiff avers in his complaint that 
defendant "is a public body and a governmental entity" (R. 1, 
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1 2); he is consequently bound by the requirement to show that 
the school district owed him a duty beyond the duty it owed to 
the public at large. His attempt to eliminate the "special 
relationship" requirement from this case runs contrary to binding 
Utah precedent. 
Plaintiff asserts that the school district violated a duty 
to him through its failure to protect him, claiming that "Ms. 
Benallie did not give any instructions to anyone and did not try 
to stop Mr. Thomas, or anyone else, from trying to start the 
engine in the way being attempted by Mr. Ebert, his co-employee, 
and Mr. Thomas" (Brief of Appellant at 8). Accepting this 
allegation as true, solely for purposes of this argument, it does 
not relieve plaintiff of the necessity of showing a "special 
relationship" with the school district. "In cases where the 
alleged negligence consists of a failure to act, the person 
injured by another's inaction must demonstrate the existence of 
some special relationship between the parties creating a duty on 
the part of the latter to exercise such due care in behalf of the 
former." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 
1983); see also Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 
835 (Utah 1984); Turnbauah v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 944 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
As to whether plaintiff established a "special relationship 
with the school district, the court explained, 
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Although the court finds that the [defendant]1 
owed a duty of due care to properly maintain the 1984 
Suburban, the Court finds that the Plaintiff does not 
fall within the ambit of those persons to whom the duty 
was owed. The 1984 Suburban was disabled in a parking 
lot, allegedly with "vapor lock," when the Plaintiff 
offered to help without being asked by Defendant or any 
of its agents. The Court cannot find, on the basis of 
the record, that the Defendant, through any of its 
agents, including Ms. Benallie, assumed responsibility 
for the safety of the Plaintiff who was a "volunteer." 
Under the circumstances of this case, there were no 
"special relationships" existing between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant as discussed in Beach v. University 
of Utah, 726 P.2d 312 (Utah 1986) at 415, that would 
impose a duty to protect the Plaintiff. 
R. 273. In Beach, the supreme court noted that "[o]rdinarily, a 
party does not have an affirmative duty to care for another." 
Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 P.2d at 415. The court further 
observed that "[t]he law imposes upon one party an affirmative 
duty to act only when certain special relationships exist between 
the parties. Those relationships generally arise when one 
assumes responsibility for another's safety or deprives another 
of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection." Id. 
Plaintiff has pointed to nothing in the record that suggests the 
school district, through Ms. Benallie or otherwise, took 
responsibility for his safety or denied him his normal 
opportunities for self-protection. In fact, he rebuffed Ms. 
Benallie's attempted communication (R. 163) in favor of the 
conversation he initiated with others who were attempting to 
start the Suburban, as revealed by his deposition testimony: 
Q: As you were walking back did anyone stop you 
*The order mistakenly reads, "Although the Court finds that 
the Plaintiff owed a duty of care . . . " (R. 273). 
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or ask you to do something? 
No. 
Okay. Tell me what you did next then. 
Then I came and talked to [BIA janitor] Ebert and 
said, "What happened, you guys? Won't start?" 
And I did talk straight to -- express back and 
forth about what Mr. Star [Ebert] was doing. And 
he said that, "Well, these kids got stuck and they 
couldn't start it and something happened to them." 
And the hood was already open. And so I 
stopped right there and said, "If you need a hand, 
I'll help you." 
So that's when I started helping him. And 
that's --at the time he had a coffee can of gas 
And Robin Benallie was already there? 
She was already there, standing with the kids on 
the other side on the step. 
Did you talk to her? 
I don't specifically remember exact words, what 
she said, but I know she said something. But 
mostly I responded to the guy that was talking to 
me straight and forth to the vehicle, which was 
Mr. Star. I keep telling him, "I pour [the 
gasoline] now, you start it now and see what 
happens. 
R. 162-63. Far from showing the creation of a "special 
relationship," this exchange demonstrates that plaintiff ignored 
Ms. Benallie and involved himself in the situation without her 
encouragement or solicitation. Rather than being denied his 
normal opportunities for self-protection, he willingly exposed 
himself to the dangers that ultimately caused his injury. 
Further, his testimony shows that he directed at least a part of 
the action: 
Q: Tell me what you remember happening then. You've 
told me you are pouring the gas in. Did you 
expect Mr. Star to try to turn the engine as you 
were pouring gas in? Or was he supposed to wait 
until you told him to go ahead? 
A: Well, it seemed like the amount of time that he 
did it himself -- you know, he poured it in there 
and he got in the vehicle, it backfired and kind 
of choked a little bit -- I think that's the 
A 
Q 
A 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
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backfiring. Kind of shoo, and then it stopped. 
That's when I went over there. And we waited and 
then I poured it in and I told him to start it 
then, "Turn it right now." So that's when -- I 
had the can away from the carburetor. 
Q: An that's when the flames --
A: No. That's when he started again and did the same 
thing. It was turning and starting to turn and 
then it conked out. So my third time I approach 
it -- that's where I don't know if he turned the 
keys on or if there was some spark in there or if 
there was flames in there. As I pour it in, all 
of a sudden it just shoo and hell broke loose. So 
I don't really know if he had the keys on or if he 
was doing it. But I know I ordered him to turn on 
--I don't know if I told him to turn it on, but I 
was pouring the gas, and that's when it blew up in 
our face. 
R. 166-67. 
Plaintiff has failed to distinguish himself from any other 
member of the public with respect to the defendant school 
district. Anyone could have stopped to volunteer assistance in 
the same way he did. He was not singled out by an agent of the 
school district requesting his help. His actions were not 
directed by an agent of the school district. In fact, Ms. 
Benallie testified in her deposition that just before the 
backfire, "I was telling him, 'Well, I just called [the school 
district]. They told me to leave it alone.1 And I think he told 
me, 'Oh, we can get it started' or something. And then I don't 
know if they started -- I think they started the engine, and then 
flames shot up" (R. 154). It appears from this uncontroverted 
testimony that plaintiff was acting against, not in compliance 
with, Ms. Benallie's express intentions. 
The Suburban, at rest in the boarding school parking lot, 
was not dangerous to anyone. Only when plaintiff unforeseeably 
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involved himself in attempting to restart it in a dangerous 
manner did it become a mechanism of injury. Plaintiff stood in 
no different relationship to the school district than any other 
member of the public. The school district did not act to deprive 
him of his normal means of self-protection or to guarantee his 
safety. Because, under these circumstances, the school district 
owed no affirmative duty of care to plaintiff individually, the 
district court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor. 
Plaintiff has provided no reasoned analysis on which to base a 
reversal of that decision. 
II. THE CASES ON WHICH PLAINTIFF RELIES ARE EASILY 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT ACTION. 
Plaintiff cites a number of cases, primarily from other 
jurisdictions, in support of his argument that the school 
district owes him a duty of care. See Brief of Appellant at 
11-15. Each of these cases is easily distinguishable from the 
case at bar. 
Two of the cases are cited for the proposition "that the 
owner of a vehicle may be held liable to a third person for 
personal injuries caused by a defective condition of which the 
owner had or should have had knowledge" (Brief of Appellant at 
12). However, the result in both cases turns on statutory 
liability. In Murry v. Advanced Asphalt Co., 751 P.2d 209 (Okla. 
App. 1987), the plaintiff was injured when her vehicle was struck 
by a trailer that had become separated from a dump truck. The 
evidence showed that the trailer had not been properly secured 
with a pin and safety chains as required by statute. The court 
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held that the statutory violation constituted negligence per se. 
Murry, 751 P.2d at 212. Bush v. Middleton, 340 P.2d 474 (Okla. 
1959), involved a plaintiff who was injured in an automobile 
collision when the brakes failed on a car belonging to Middleton 
while it was being driven by a potential purchaser. The 
appellate court reversed the demurrer in favor of Middleton on 
grounds of statutory requirements mandating adequate brakes and 
prohibiting a vehicle owner from permitting an unsafe vehicle to 
be driven on a highway. In the present case, plaintiff has 
pointed to no statutory duty violated by the school district. 
Thus, these cases are inapposite. 
Plaintiff also cites Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 418 
So.2d 493 (La. 1982), in support of his claim that an owner's 
actual or constructive knowledge of a chattel's defective 
condition confers a duty on the owner to take reasonable steps to 
protest against injurious consequences of that condition. 
However, the case interpreted a Louisiana Civil Code provision 
under Louisiana case law. Plaintiff has made no showing of a 
similar Utah statute. 
To establish the breadth of foreseeability, plaintiff 
invokes two Arizona cases and an Oklahoma case. Although Rudolph 
v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation, 182 Ariz. 622, 898 P.2d 1000 
(1995), does stand for the general proposition that Arizona 
courts view the class of risks and the class of foreseeable 
victims broadly in establishing a duty between litigants, 
plaintiff fails to recognize that, in contrast, when suing a 
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government entity in Utah, he must establish a special duty of 
care owed to him individually (see Point I, supra). Alhambra 
School District v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 38, 796 P.2d 470 
(1990), turns again on statutory as well as common law duty under 
Arizona, not Utah, interpretation. Moreover, both cases were 
decided subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Arizona in Ryan v. State, which abandoned the public duty 
doctrine that had been adopted in Massencrill v. Yuma County, 104 
Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969): 
11
 [W] e conclude that the doctrine in Massengill should 
be abandoned and that case is overruled. We shall no 
longer engage in the speculative exercise of 
determining whether the tort-feasor has a general duty 
to the injured party, which spells no recovery, or if 
he had a specific individual duty which means recovery. 
Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982). As 
discussed above, the public duty doctrine is alive and well in 
Utah. And while Baine v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 850 P.2d 
346 (Okla. App. 1992), states a general rule extending a duty to 
all foreseeably endangered persons, it also notes that a duty to 
the particular plaintiff is a threshold question (Baine, 850 P.2d 
at 348)--one that was unmet by the plaintiff in that case. As 
the Baine court recognized, the defendant was under "no duty to 
'anticipate every possible fortuitous circumstance that might 
cause injurious contacts'" with the mechanism of injury. Id. at 
349-50 (quoting Florida Power and Light Co. v. Lively, 465 So.2d 
1270, 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)). 
Even the Utah cases plaintiff cites are unavailing. 
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Language he quotes from Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North 
America, 669 P.2d 410, 416 (Utah 1983), acknowledging 
foreseeability as a measure of the scope of a defendant's duty in 
tort, is presented only as a general premise against which to 
contrast the interpretation of contractual language at issue in 
the case. Such general statements do little to illuminate the 
"special relationship" plaintiff is obligated to show in order to 
recover against a Utah governmental defendant. Nor does Drysdale 
ex rel. Strong v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1994), serve 
plaintiff's contentions. Not only does it emphasize the general 
applicability of the "special relationship" analysis in Utah (869 
P.2d at 2), but finds no special relationship--and hence, no 
duty--between the plaintiff and defendant on the facts of the 
case. 
As noted in Point I above, it is well established in Utah 
case law that unless plaintiff can demonstrate a duty running to 
him as an individual distinct from the general public, defendant 
is necessarily without liability to him. Plaintiff cannot bypass 
this showing by relying on less rigorous standards of courts in 
other jurisdictions. His reliance on these non-controlling cases 
ought not to be credited. 
CONCLUSION 
In the district court, plaintiff failed to establish an 
essential element of his negligence claim: that defendant owed 
him an individual duty of care. No further inquiry was necessary 
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to dispose of the case, as without a duty, no liability for 
negligence is possible. Plaintiff's attempt to skip over this 
threshold inquiry cannot overcome his burden of proof. Because 
he did not meet that burden, the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to the school district warrants this Court's 
affirmance. 
Therefore, defendant respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm the judgment of the district court. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendant believes the law is sufficiently established as to 
the issue in this case that a decision can be rendered without 
oral argument and published opinion. However, in the event that 
oral argument is ordered by the Court, defendant wishes to 
participate. 
Dated this [4r- day of September, 1999. 
i-C 
Nancy ii. Kemp 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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